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Abstract
Following the breakdown of central planning by the early 1990s, transition economies faced
varying measures of the need for economic restructuring and stabilisation. This paper examines
both the trends in economic performance in eight eastern European countries and the degree of
central bank independence (CBI) granted after reforms. The evidence of the paper indicates that
both the measures of CBI and the measures of financial market development (FMD) show significant
association with macroeconomic variables. Also, the sample exhibits positive association between
CBI and measures of FMD. © 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Since 1989, the former centrally-planned economies have launched political and eco-
nomic reforms that included varying degrees of stabilisation, liberalisation, restructuring
and privatisation. In countries where decades of central planning prevented the development
of market forces and institutional mechanisms for efficient resource allocation, transition to
a market economy required substantial institution building. By investigating both the status
of central banking reforms and their role in economic performance, this paper focuses on
one such aspect of institution building.
A common feature of financial sector reforms in transition economies was replacing the
monobank system with a two-tier system that legally separated savings and commercial
banks from the central bank (CB). 1 Savings and commercial banks thus emerged out of the
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1 Thorne (1993) provides a detailed account of bank reforms in Hungary, Poland, CSFR, Bulgaria and Romania.
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former branches of the CB and took over the management of saving and credit transactions
with the household and enterprise sectors. The persisting linkages within the financial
system and those between the financial system and the enterprise sector, on the one hand,
and both of their linkages with the government, on the other, posed impediments for rapid
success in stabilising transition economies to varying extents. 2
In addition to the weak financial system, concentrated industrial structures and large
state-owned enterprises of the central planning period enhanced the capacity of enterprises
to organise as special-interest lobbying groups. During transition, these enterprises op-
posed market reforms since they desired to maintain the flow of resources that they were
accustomed to obtain, regardless of the degree of their efficiency. 3 Moreover, a sizeable
portion of the banking sector that remained state- or enterprise-owned continued to lend to
inefficient enterprises.
Local governments also posed an additional source of resistance to bank and enterprise
structuring. As fiscal decentralisation of the former socialist states led local governments to
assume many social spending functions at the local level, the central government maintained
much of the tax collection function. Local governments therefore resisted the privatisation
of local enterprises that remained to be their main source of revenue.
Furthermore, in the absence of prudent regulatory and supervisory mechanisms, managers
of banks and enterprises that are subject to restructuring often appropriated the profits and
assets. Recapitalising such banks and enterprises necessitated large amounts of funds. Given
the implied social or political costs of restructuring enterprises that are “too big to fail”,
fiscal and monetary authorities in many transition economies continued to subsidise them.
Thus, the continued flow of funds to inefficient enterprises generated substantial pressure
for inflationary monetary expansion in many transition economies.
Inherited economic distortions generated further challenge to stabilisation and market
reforms in transition economies. As the inherited monetary overhang and shortages led
to high rates of inflation in the periods that followed price liberalisation, expectations of
a reform failure and uncertainty about the new relative price structures led enterprises to
initially set prices above the market-clearing levels in order to obtain short-term gains.
Moreover, as state control over the economy subsided, tax revenues declined, 4 increasing
the fiscal deficits and thus pressures for inflationary credit expansion. At the onset of market
reforms, most transition economies lacked the institutional mechanisms that were necessary
to eliminate inflationary pressures, such as a developed financial sector and a sophisticated
tax collection system. The absence of both fiscal and financial discipline aggravated these
difficulties in implementing market reforms.
This paper argues that both central bank independence (CBI) and financial market de-
velopment (FMD) may facilitate market reforms by helping to enforce fiscal and financial
discipline. CBI is generally considered a mechanism to separate monetary policy from
2 During central planning, the central bank provided funds to enterprises, not according to enterprise efficiency,
but according to a central plan. As a result, banks lacked incentives to avoid risk and thus a large portion of a
bank portfolio typically consisted of non-performing or low-quality enterprise loans, generating a great source of
pressure on central bank financing.
3 See Olson (1995) for the case of the former Soviet Union.
4 McKinnon (1992) gives examples to this phenomenon from the USSR and China. The same phenomenon can
also be observed in other transition economies, such as Poland, Hungary and Romania.
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short-term fiscal pressures; it thus symbolises the commitment of political authorities to
price stability (Barro and Gordon, 1983; Cukierman and Meltzer, 1989; Cukierman, 1992).
In addition, several studies, including Grilli et al. (1991), Alesina and Summers (1993)
and Cukierman, Webb, Neypati (1992) and Cukierman, Miller, Neypati (2001, in press),
show the negative association of CBI with the level and variability of inflation. In view
of the increase in the number of legally independent CBs in the 1990s, Maxfield (1994,
1997) studies the underlying motives and circumstances for creating an independent CB
in developing countries. Among those motives, she emphasises the motive of signalling
creditworthiness.
Policy makers who are strongly committed to establishing financial discipline and price
stability may grant CBI. Maintaining CBI, however, requires, inter alia, politically powerful
groups that have anti-inflationary incentives. As Goodman (1991) and Posen (1994) point
out, FMD is most likely to yield such strong anti-inflationary interest groups. A developed
financial market not only provides the government with non-inflationary means to finance
fiscal deficits and is, therefore, usually associated with low inflation, but it is also likely to
generate a strong opposition to inflation, because inflation harms financial intermediaries
that lend long term and borrow short term. Hence, as a developed financial market facilitates
both establishing and maintaining an independent CB, CBI, in turn, facilitates FMD by
forcing, through hard budget constraints, financial intermediaries to lend efficiently.
Economies with high inflation and deficits may, nevertheless, have difficulty in adopting
laws and regulations to attain an independent CB and a developed financial system as the
government’s financing needs and the formation of inflation lobbies usually hinder such
developments. Hence, causality between such institutional measures and macroeconomic
indicators can in fact be both ways.
This paper explores the association of both CBI and FMD with the economic performance
of eight former centrally-planned eastern European countries in transition, namely, Albania,
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovenia.
The measure of the degree of CBI is based on the set of criteria developed by Cukierman
et al. (1992, referred to as CWN herein). This measurement reveals that many transition
economies in eastern Europe have adopted laws that grant the CB rather high degrees of
independence, even when compared to the Bundesbank which is considered to be the most
independent CB. We then modify this set of criteria by adding three other criteria: (1)
financial independence of the CB, (2) supervision of banks, and (3) emergency credits,
the latter of which is particularly relevant for transition economies, where, due to a weak
financial system, the CB is more likely to be viewed as the lender of last resort than otherwise.
Next, we provide several measures of FMD: the ratio of credit to the private sector to
GDP, the M2 to GDP ratio (also called as financial deepening), the interest spread (lending−
deposit rate), the ratio of time deposits to GDP (as a measure of confidence in the banking
sector 5 ) and, the real interest rates.
Finally, we investigate the association of these CBI and FMD indices with some major
macroeconomic indicators. The findings of this analysis suggest that both the degree of CBI
5 Clague et al. (1995) use the ratio of the non-currency component of M2, which they call as “contract-intensive
money”, as a measure of institutional development and observe that this indicator is positively associated with the
level of financial market development.
384 B. Neyapti / Economic Systems 25 (2001) 381–399
Table 1
Dates of major reforms in eastern Europea
Latest central
bank law
Economic
reforms
Breakdown of
the monobank
Political reforms/
independence
First free
elections
Albania April 1992 August 1992 August 1992 December 1990 March 1991
Bulgaria June 1991 February 1991 March 1990 November 1989 June 1990
Czech
Republic
December 1991 January 1991 January 1990 November 1989 June 1990
Hungary October 1991 January 1991 January 1987 October 1989 April 1990
Poland October 1991 January 1990 February 1989 April 1989 December 1990
Romania January 1991 April 1991 December 1990 December 1989 May 1990
Slovak
Republic
November 1992 January 1991 January 1990 December 1992 June 1990
Slovenia October 1991 October 1991 1958 June 1991 April 1990
a Source: Keesings, various issues.
and the measures of FMD appear to be related with selected macroeconomic variables of
interest.
2. Measurement of central bank independence
In this section, we investigate the recent CB laws of Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic
and Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovenia, which were all enacted in
the early 1990s. Table 1 reports the dates of these reforms, as well as the dates of other
important economic and political reforms in these countries.
To measure the degree of CBI, we employ the comprehensive list of criteria developed
by CWN. CWN measure the degree of legal CBI based on 16 criteria constructed from CB
charters. They summarise these criteria in four main groups: (i) the chief executive officer
(CEO) (appointment, dismissal, term of office and freedom to hold a position in the govern-
ment sector), (ii) the main objective of the CB, (iii) policy formulations—the role of the CB
in formulating monetary policy and affecting government budget decisions—and, (iv) limi-
tations on lending—the terms of lending and the role of the CB in the determination of these
terms. Appendix A lists these criteria in detail and reports the decision rules for coding. 6
As demonstrated in Appendix B, the CBs of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and
Slovenia have the highest degree of independence in terms of legal provisions for the CEO.
These countries also have the lowest rates of inflation in the period immediately following
the enactment of the recent CB laws. In addition, according to the list of criteria classified
as policy formulations, the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic, followed by
Poland, rank the highest. By contrast, Romania has the lowest degree of CBI with respect
to the CEO, the objectives of the CB and the limitations on lending. This observation is
consistent with Romania also having the highest rate of inflation, along with Bulgaria,
during the 3 years following the enactment of the recent CB laws.
6 Due to the mostly qualitative nature of the set of criteria to measure CBI, the numerical codings may contain
some degree of subjectivity. We nevertheless try to minimize this problem by using a detailed set of decision rules
to code each criterion.
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Table 2
Indices of legal CBIa based on CWN criteria
Albania Bulgaria Czech
Republic
Hungary Poland Romania Slovak
Republic
Slovenia
Legal CBI 0.34 0.49 0.62 0.63 0.36 0.26 0.42 0.56
Rank 7 4 2 1 6 8 5 3
a Normalised to between 0 and 1, increasing numbers indicate more independence.
With respect to legal limitations on lending, Bulgaria, Albania and the Slovak Republic
are placed at the top of the sample, while Poland and Romania are ranked at the bottom.
The fact that both Albania and Bulgaria have had some of the highest budget deficits and
output declines in the sample, however, brings into question the feasibility of enforcing the
legal limitations on lending in these countries.
Table 2 reports the aggregate indices of legal CBI based on these four groups or the 16
criteria documented in Appendix A. According to these indices, all countries in the sample,
with the exception of Romania, have adopted CB laws that indicate relatively high degrees
of independence. In fact, five out of the eight countries have a higher than the mean level
(0.36) of legal CBI in the developed countries sample used in CWN. In addition, the legal
CBI indices for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia match the top 25%
ranking for the developed countries reported in the CWN for the 1980s.
In this paper, we modify CWN’s criteria for legal CBI by including three additional
criteria, based on Neyapti (1997). We report below those criteria along with the decision
rules for their coding. In addition, Appendix B lists the modified measurement criteria,
along with the numerical codings of the sample countries.
Additional criteria to measure CBI
Financial independence (determination of the budget of the CB and salaries of
high-ranking bank officials)
Mostly the CB
Mostly the CB or fixed by law
Mixture of the CB, executive and legislative
Mostly the executive and legislative
Supervisory role
Detailed rules and regulations by the CB on credit extended by the banks,
close monitoring on compliance and penalty enforcement
The CB is involved in close monitoring, such as in case of decisions on
bank reorganisation
The CB has the right to examine and demand periodical auditing
No clear statement on supervisory functions
Emergency credit
There is no provision on emergency credit to the banks
There exists a provision on the possibility of emergency credit with no strict limits
Note that the increasing numbers indicate decreasing independence.
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The criterion of financial independence codifies the role of the government in deter-
mining both the budget and salaries of the higher-ranking staff of the CB. With these
criteria, we intend to measure the government’s influence on the decision making of CB
officers. 7
We hypothesise that good banking regulation and supervision facilitate the enforce-
ment of hard budget constraints and thus enforce fiscal and financial discipline, which
in turn helps to sustain CBI. Although, we do not necessarily advocate the view that
the CB should supervise the banking system, CBs usually do perform this function. 8
(In our sample of eight eastern European countries, the exception to this is Hungary,
where the Banking Supervisory Committee, which consists of the representatives of the
CB, the government and the banking system, is responsible for bank supervision.) We
therefore evaluate the quality of bank supervision based on the stipulations in CB
laws.
Co-ordinating bank supervision with the CBs’ role as both the guarantor of the payments
system and as the lender of the last resort is one of the arguments for vesting bank supervision
with an independent CB. If, however, a CB rescues problem banks to avoid contagion effects,
it may secure long-term financial stability, but possibly damage its credibility, since such
bank rescues usually require monetary expansion, which conflicts with the goal of price
stability. On the other hand, a strict regulator that permits bank failures that, in turn, lead
to systemic failures may, in effect, require a wider-scale CB rescue. Goodhart (1995), Roe
(1992), Heller (1991) and Sundararajan (1990) all discuss the advantages and disadvantages
of the CB’s performing the function of bank supervision. This paper takes the view that
clear mandates about the CB’s role in bank supervision can facilitate the implementation
of hard budget constraints.
We also include the terms of emergency credits to banks in the list of criteria to measure
CBI. Transition economies are especially prone to banks becoming illiquid or insolvent,
which often threatens the stability of the whole system. Thus, in addition to strong bank
supervision and regulation to reduce the risk of financial failures, limiting the CB’s emer-
gency lending to banks would help to enforce the credibility of hard budget constraints. This
could help create financial discipline, which, in turn, would help maintain the independence
of the CB.
Table 3 reports the legal CBI indices based on this modified set of criteria, which combines
the 16 criteria of CWN with the above three. In addition, it provides the ranks of countries
based on these indices.
7 CWN use this criteria to form the questionnaire-based indices of CBI, to proxy the degree of independence in
practice. In this study, we incorporate this criterion to modify the measurement of CBI based on central bank laws.
8 Although there is no clear evidence to suggest that the central bank is better in bank supervision than other
supervisory agencies, according to a survey by Goodhart (1995), in half of the 22 developed countries central
banks are in charge of bank supervision. In addition, Goodhart reports that, of the 104 cases of bank failures in 24
(mostly developed) countries since the 1980s, in only 33 cases did the central bank have a supervisory function.
In the majority of the remaining cases, the supervisory function was performed by the government. There were
27 cases where the central bank was the only source of funding for the failing banks, but only in six of those cases
did the central bank hold the supervisory function. Thus, he concludes that there is no clear case for or against the
separation of the supervisory function from the monetary authority.
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Table 3
Modified indices of legal CBIa
Albania Bulgaria Czech
Republic
Hungary Poland Romania Slovak
Republic
Slovenia
Legal CBI 0.35 0.54 0.64 0.6 0.44 0.31 na 0.71
Rank 6 4 2 3 5 7 na 1
a Normalised to between 0 and 1, increasing numbers indicate more independence.
2.1. Compliance with central bank law
To measure the degree of compliance with CB laws, we compare the legal lending limits
with the actual lending practices of the CBs. We note that an independent CB may be a mere
formal institutional arrangement and may, in some economies, be largely associated with
lack of compliance. To measure such deviation from the intent of the law, Table 4 compares
the legal limits on CB lending to the government with the figures in practice.
CWN argue that limiting the CB’s lending to the government in terms of the shares of
government revenues implies a relatively higher degree of CBI than limiting it in terms
of government expenditures, since the latter implies relatively more government discretion
(see decision rules for the coding criteria in Appendix A). Accordingly, in the most recent
CB laws of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Hungary, the limitations
on CB lending to the government are defined as up to 5% of the government revenues
(based on the expected or the past levels, depending on the country). Although the limits
of lending for Poland and Slovenia are defined in terms of government expenditures, the
limits are also quite strict (2 and 5%, respectively). By contrast, the limits on CB lending
to the government appear much looser in Romania and Albania than in the rest of the
sample.
Table 4
Comparisons between actual lending and the legal limitsa
Legal lending limits on central
bank credit to the government
Actual central bank credit
(percentage of the basis of the legal limits)b
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Albania 10% of past government revenue
Bulgaria 5% of expected govt. revenue
Czech Republic 5% of past government revenue – – −11.5 −5.7
Hungary 3% of expected govt. revenue 6.7 1.6 5.7 −2.4
Poland 2% of expected govt. expenditure 13.1 4.6 3.6 −5.6
Romania 10% of expected govt expenditure 4.4 8.8 1.1 8.5 7.2
Slovak Republic 5% of past government revenue – 0.0 −9.0
Slovenia 5% of expected government
expenditure (or 20% of deficit)
0.1 1.5 −0.4 0
a Sources: central bank and statistical bulletins, IMF, international financial statistics and MultiQuery database,
The World Bank, Europe and central Asia region, 1996.
b Start year: last CB laws; 1995: preliminary.
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Among the countries for which data is available, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and
Romania were within the limits of lending that are stipulated in the respective CB charters.
Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic have joined this group in 1995. Although the CB
of Romania did not violate the legal limits of lending, the amount of lending was, except
for 1993, relatively high. In Poland, there has been a substantial decline in CB lending to
the government since 1993.
We note, however, that data on budget deficits and credit possibly contain errors due to
various measurement problems pertaining to transition. In addition, data coverage is mostly
limited to central governments, except for Poland and Romania where data on the general
government is available. The lack of consistent measurement of the sizeable quasi-fiscal
deficits poses important problems for empirical analyses. Moreover, data on credit is lacking
for Albania and Bulgaria. This analysis, therefore, is only a preliminary attempt to measure
the compliance with CB laws and can be improved as more and better quality data becomes
available.
2.2. Other measurements of central bank independence for transition economies
Siklos (1993) employs CWN’s method of measuring CBI in a study that covers half of
this study’s sample, namely Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics. His
analysis, however, differ from ours not only in sample coverage, but also in its approach
and findings. 9 In addition, the codings of the legal CBI in Siklos do not entirely match our
codings, not only because he uses only a subset of the measurement criteria of CWN, but also
because his interpretation of the law differs from ours with respect to some of the codings.
Moreover, Siklos uses the actual and legal measures of CBI together by incorporating a set
of economic conditions in the set of criteria to measure CBI. 10 His codings give Czech
and Polish CBs the highest ranking, Hungary the second and the Slovak Republic the
lowest.
Loungani and Sheets (1997) examine the relationship between CB and inflation in 12
formerly socialist economies. Based on Debelle and Fischer (1994) approach, the authors
measure CBI by an aggregation of goal independence and economic independence of the
CB in 12 transition economies, 6 of which are the eastern and central European countries
in our sample. According to this measure, the degree of CBI in Bulgaria and the Czech
Republic matches with that of Germany. Among the countries that overlap with our sample,
their ranking assigns the lowest independence to Hungary, and deviates largely form our
ranking reported in Tables 2 and 3. 11
9 Using monthly data, Siklos estimates the reaction function for the central banks of Hungary and Poland and
measures CBI both by the countercyclicality of money growth and interest rates and by the insensitiveness of these
variables to political instability (proxied by elections and government change). He suggests that the Hungarian
central bank is more independent than the Polish one, though using different time periods and lag structures for
the two countries.
10 Legal degree of CBI can also be a product of prevailing economic circumstances. However, causality can run
both ways. CWN also address this question by providing measures of actual CBI: questionnaire-based indices and
turnover rates of central bank governors.
11 Loungani and Sheets’ (1997) CBI codes for the countries that overlap with our sample are as follows: Albania:
0.75, Bulgaria: 0.875; Czech Republic: 0.875; Hungary: 0.312; Poland: 0.5 and Romania: 0.5.
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Table 5
Measures of FMDa
Albania Bulgaria Czech
Republic
Hungary Poland Romania Slovak
Republic
Slovenia
CRprvt 3.8% 4.4% 28.9% – 11% – 28% 23%
M2GDP 40% 62% 67% 45% 31% 18% 69% 24%
l-d 5.9 32 6.7 8.6 7.3 25.8 5.7 15.5
TDGDP 11% – 45% 25% 24% 12% 39% 28%
Rint −14 0.97 −4.9 6.5 2.5 – −0.1 5.8
a The definitions are given in Section 3. Data is in averages over the 3 years following the enactment of the
most recent central bank laws, where available. Data are obtained from European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, 1999, Transition Update; and Global Development Finance and World Development Indicators of
the World Bank.
3. The relationship between CB independence, financial market development
and macroeconomic performance
This section explores the association of both the modified index of CBI and the indices
of FMD with four macroeconomic indicators: inflation, the ratio of budget deficits to GDP
and the growth rate of real output. We use several indicators to measure FMD: M2:GDP
ratio (M2GDP), the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP (CRprvt), the spread between
lending and deposit interests (l-d), real interest rates, and the ratio of time deposits (including
savings and foreign deposits) to GDP (TDGDP). The first of these measures is a measure
of financial deepening. The last variable (TDGDP) is also called quasi-money, which, due
to its non-liquid nature, is considered to reflect confidence in the financial system. 12 Since
none of these indicators is, by itself, a perfect measure of FMD, we employ all of them in
our tests. Table 5 reports all these indicators for the years that follow the enactment of the
CB laws in the sample countries, when available.
We note that the correlations between both financial deepening (M2GDP) and CBI and
TDGDP and CBI are positive and significant at the 5% level. Though the rest of the FMD
measures are also correlated with CBI with the expected signs, they are not statistically
significant at conventional levels. In the empirical analysis below, we test the hypotheses
that both CBI and FMD are negatively correlated with inflation and deficits, and positively
correlated with real growth.
3.1. Some observations
Data on the macroeconomic variables 13 reveal that the majority of the countries in the
sample had their highest rate of output declines in 1991, ranging from as high as 28% in
Albania to 7% in Hungary. Gradual implementation of market reforms in that country since
the 1970s can explain the relatively low peak output decline in Hungary. The peak levels
of output decline in the Slovak Republic and Poland occurred in 1989 and 1990, by 50%
12 See Clague et al. (1995). Here, quasi-money includes foreign deposits.
13 Data is obtained from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1999, Transition Update. Data on
some of the FMD measures, namely CRprvt and rint, are obtained from World Bank reports.
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and 12%, respectively. Three of the eight countries in our sample also experienced their
highest inflation rates in 1991: the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic with 57% and
61%, respectively, Hungary with 35%. Five of the eight countries in the sample reduced
their average annual inflation rates to below 15% by 1998. Since 1997, after the adoption of
the new CB laws, Bulgaria, in the aftermath of the extensive banking crisis, and Romania
experienced the highest rate of inflation in the sample.
During the period from 1994 to 1996, Albania, Poland and the Slovak Republic all
recorded significant rates of real GDP growth—more than 5% on average, on an annual basis.
The rest of the countries in the sample, with the exception of Bulgaria, also showed varying
degrees of recovery after the reforms. 14 In 1997, however, Albania, Bulgaria and Roma-
nia all experienced significant output losses, partly attributable to the prevalent financial
crises.
By 1996, five of the countries in the sample managed to reduce their budget deficits to
below 5% of GDP. By contrast, Albania and Bulgaria experienced persistent high budget
deficits since the reforms, though a recovery is observed in Bulgaria since 1997. Slovenia
and the Czech Republic have experienced relatively better budgetary performances than the
rest of the countries. In addition, unemployment continues to be a significant problem in
almost all countries in the sample, in which the Czech Republic ranks lowest with 7.5% in
1998.
In most of the sample countries, the decline in inflation coincides with the introduction
of new CB laws, most of which implied relatively high degrees of independence. Only in
Bulgaria and Romania, however, inflation reached triple digits after the enactment of its
most recent CB law. Of these, it is interesting to note that the CB of Romania has the lowest
degree of independence of all the countries in the sample (Table 3).
These observations may suggest a positive association between CBI and price stability.
The causality between CBI and price stability, however, can go both ways. On the one
hand, an independent CB may help to achieve price stability by implementing hard budget
constraints and by pursuing policies geared to long-term financial stability; on the other
hand, serious reformers who secure social and political support for market reforms, and
also face favourable initial economic conditions, may be more likely to adopt laws that
grant the CBI.
Indeed, the relatively favourable initial conditions—such as the lower external debt of the
Czech Republic and Slovak Republic, the weaker enterprise associations in Hungary and
the Czech Republic, the partially liberalised price structure and partial commercialisation
in Hungary, as well as in Poland, have possibly all contributed to these countries’ relatively
better economic performances after the initiation of market reforms. 15 By 1994, GDP shares
of the private sector in the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Poland and Hungary reached
56, 58, 52 and 60%, respectively. By contrast, Bulgaria and Romania still had relatively
small private sector shares in GDP, 21.8 and 35%, respectively (no data are available for
Albania and Slovenia). The higher share of the private sector in the Czech Republic, Slovak
14 Difficulties, however, exist in comparing the post-reform output figures with their pre-reform levels due to
unaccounted private sector and informal trade in the latter period as well as the welfare effects of the reforms, for
example the reduction of shortages (Lane, 1992).
15 Belcerowitz (1995) discusses the importance of these factors in some eastern European countries in transition.
B. Neyapti / Economic Systems 25 (2001) 381–399 391
Republic, Poland and Hungary in 1994 also corresponds to the relative shares of the private
sector in these countries prior to the reforms.
Moreover, the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Hungary are the only countries
in the sample that have not experienced triple-digit inflation rates since the initiation of
reforms. Not only have the Czech Republic and Hungary had, on average, much lower
rates of inflation than the rest of the sample since 1989, but they have also had the high-
est degree of CBI in the sample (Tables 2 and 3 16 ). It thus appears that the initial eco-
nomic conditions and market structures may be closely associated with the success of
market reforms. CB reforms can be viewed as a part of the wide ranging economic re-
forms induced by the prevailing economic conditions, institutions and incentive structures.
There may therefore be a simultaneous relationship between CBI and macroeconomic
performance.
3.2. Correlation analysis
To analyse the impact of CB reforms on economic performance, we distinguish between
two periods over which we average the time-series data in every country. First, we use the
data that cover 1 year before and 1 year after the enactment of the most recent CB laws
(also including the year of the enactment, if close to the mid-year) in order to account
for the initial economic status of each country. Second, we use the period covering the
3 years after the enactment dates of the most recent CB laws in each country. Hence,
the analysis employed here is an event analysis, rather than a panel, or cross-sectional
study.
Due to the small number of data points, we simply perform rank correlation tests to
analyse the association between macroeconomic performance indicators and CBI and FMD
in the sample countries. Tables 6 and 7 report the rank correlations, with robust errors,
corresponding to the first and second sample periods, respectively. 17 Table 6 shows that both
CBI and FMD (measured by M2GDP and the interest spread: l-d) are significantly correlated
with inflation with the expected signs. 18 The positive correlation between both M2GDP
and TDGDP and real growth is possibly due to the positive impact of both price stability
and financial sector discipline on investment and growth. Among the FMD indicators, only
M2GDP is significantly correlated with deficits, where the positive correlation indicates that
M2GDP may in fact not be a good measure of financial deepening, at least in the transition
context.
When we use averages of data over the periods that cover 3 years after the enactment of
the most recent CB laws, all measures of CBI and FMD, with the exception of real interest
rates are found significant at 1 and 5% levels (the latter only for CRprvt). In addition, their
coefficients, reported in Table 7, are all higher as compared to the first sample reported in
Table 6. These findings suggest that CBI may have a positive impact on lowering inflation,
notwithstanding the possible impact of favourable initial economic or structural conditions
16 According to the modified version of CBI, Hungary ranks second to Slovenia.
17 We use rank correlations to abstract from possible scaling problems, especially given the short time-series.
18 Result of the same nature obtains for the legal CBI index of CWN (1992), i.e. before modification, with the
addition, however, of a significant positive correlation of that index with real GDP growth.
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on both the creation of relatively more independent CBs and lower levels of inflation. 19
We also observe that the correlations of both CRprvt and TDGDP with deficits become
significantly negative in the post CBI period. The negatively significant correlation between
interest spread and growth is also revealed in this sample.
Notwithstanding the difficulties in disentangling the direction of causation between
price-stability, good economic performance and institutional reforms, the main findings
of this paper thus suggest that both CBI and FMD are positively associated with good eco-
nomic performance. In particular, they suggest that both CBI and FMD are significantly
linked to inflation stabilisation. In addition, the findings suggest that there is a negative
relationship between budget deficits and FMD and positive relationship between growth
and FMD.
4. Conclusions
In view of the fiscal and financial problems inherited from the system of central planning,
this study hypothesises that both CBI and FMD are significantly related with macroeco-
nomic performance in transition economies. The measurement of legal CBI based on a
comprehensive set of criteria indicates that, in the early 1990s, many eastern European
economies in transition have enacted CB laws that granted the CBs rather high levels
of independence. We, nevertheless, argue that imposing overly strict legal lending limits
on the CB may not be sustainable and, therefore, credible in many transition economies.
Given the high social and political costs of transition, setting realistic targets for mon-
etary policies and maintaining transparency, both in lending and in rescue operations,
are important for both the credibility of monetary policies and the success of market
reforms.
Our empirical inquiry via an event analysis suggests positive association of both CBI
and FMD with price stability. In addition, credit to the private sector, in ratio to GDP, and
the ratio of time deposit to GDP, as measures of FMD, appear to be significantly associ-
ated with budget deficits and real GDP growth in the period that follows the enactment
of the recent CB laws. Another measure of FMD, the interest rate spread, is also signif-
icantly associated with growth in the period that follows the enactment of the recent CB
laws.
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19 Regression of inflation on both CBI and FMD, where the interest rate spare used as a measure, improves the
R-bar square, whereas other measures of FMD do not yield the same result.
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Appendix A
List of criteria for measuring legal CBI, CWN
Numerical
codea,b
CEO
Term of office Over 8 years 1.00
(0.05) 6–8 years 0.75
5 years 0.50
4 years 0.25
Under 4 years or at the
discretion of the
appointer
0.00
Who appoints CEO? Board of CB 1.00
(0.05) A council of CB board,
executive and
legislative branches
0.75
The legislature 0.50
The executive (council of ministers) 0.25
One or two members of executive branch 0.00
Dismissal of CEO: No provision 1.00
(0.05) Only for reasons not related to policy 0.83
At the discretion of CB board 0.67
At legislature’s discretion 0.50
Unconditional dismissal possible by legislature 0.33
At executive’s discretion 0.17
Unconditional dismissal possible by executive 0.00
May CEO hold
other offices in
the government?
No 1.00
(0.05) Only with permission of the executive branch 0.50
No rule against holding another office 0.00
Policy formulation
Who formulates? CB alone 1.00
(0.05) CB participates, but has little influence 0.67
CB only advises the government 0.33
CB has no say 0.00
Who says the final word
in resolution of conflict?
(0.05) CB, on issues defined in the law as
its objectives
1.00
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Numerical
codea,b
Government, on issues not defined as CB’s 0.80
A council of CB and executive and
legislative branches
0.60
The legislature 0.40
The executive, subject to due process and
protests of CB
0.20
Unconditional priority of the executive 0.00
Role of CB in
budgetary process:
(0.05) CB is active 1.00
CB has no influence 0.00
Objectives
(0.15) Price stability is the only objective and CB
has the final word in case it conflicts with
government objectives
1.00
Price stability is the only objective 0.80
Price stability is one of compatible goals,
such as financial stability
0.60
Price stability is one of incompatible goals,
such as full-employment
0.40
No objectives stated in the CB charter 0.20
Stated objectives do not include price stability 0.00
Limitations on lending
to the government
Advances Not permitted 1.00
(0.15) Permitted, with strict limits (up to 15% of
government revenue)
0.67
Permitted, with loose limits (over 15% of
government revenue)
0.33
No legal limits on lending 0.00
Securitised lending Not permitted 1.00
(0.10) Permitted, with strict limits (up to 15% of
government revenue)
0.67
Permitted, with loose limits (over 15% of
government revenue)
0.33
No legal limits on lending 0.00
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Numerical
codea,b
Terms of lending Controlled by the CB 1.00
(0.10) Specified by the CB charter 0.67
Agreed between the CB and the executive 0.33
Decided by the executive alone 0.00
Potential borrowers Only the central government 1.00
(0.05) All levels of government (local, state) 0.67
Those mentioned above and state enterprises 0.33
Public and private sector 0.00
Limits on lending In currency amounts 1.00
(0.025) In shares of CB demand liabilities or capital 0.67
In shares of government revenues 0.33
In shares of government expenditures 0.00
Maturity of loans Within 6 months 1.00
(0.025) Within 1 year 0.67
More than 1 year 0.33
No mention of maturity in the law 0.00
Interest rates on loans Above minimum rates 1.00
(0.025) At market rates 0.75
Below maximum rates 0.50
Interest rate is not mentioned 0.25
No interest on loans to the government 0.00
Is CB prohibited
from buying and selling
government securities
in the primary market?
(0.025) Yes 1.00
No 0.00
a Notes: (i) the ranking under each criteria indicates the degree of independence of
central banks, the higher the numerical code, the more independent is the central bank; (ii)
in case the CB law does not have a separate provision on the resolution of conflict, the codes
are based on the general impression from other provisions in the law.
b Sources: Various Central Bank Laws, 2001, Aufricht (1967); Bank for International
Settlements (1963); Effros (1982), and the IMF’s computerised files on CB laws.
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